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How can we know if local governments are spending public money
efficiently? Public procurement accounts for a significant share of OECD
countries’ expenditures. Therefore, governments are expected to execute
them as efficiently as possible. Yet, there is a lack ofmethods that allow for
an adequate comparison of procurement activity between local authorities
with different scales, representing a challenge for policymakers and
academics. Here, we use methods from Urban Scaling Laws literature to
study public procurement activity among 278 Portuguese municipalities.
We find that public expenditure scales sub-linearly with population size,
indicating economies of scale for public spending as cities increase their
population. The scaling behavior persists after desegregating by contract
type, namely Works, Goods, and Services. Moreover, using the Scale-
Adjusted Indicators, which represent the deviations from the scaling laws,
we characterize different patterns of procurement activity among regional
groups. Thus, we obtain a new local characterization of municipalities
based on the similarity of procurement activity. These results make up a
framework for quantitatively study local public expenditure by enabling
policymakers a more appropriate ground for comparative analysis.





Como saber se os governos locais estão a gastar o dinheiro público
de forma eficiente? A contratação pública corresponde a uma parte signi-
ficativa das despesas dos países da OCDE. Espera-se que os governos a
executem de forma eficiente. Ainda assim, faltam métodos que permitam
uma comparação adequada da atividade de compras entre instituições,
o que representa um desafio para legisladores e académicos. Aqui, são
usados métodos da literatura de Leis de Escala Urbana para estudar a
atividade de compras públicas entre 278 municípios portugueses. Desco-
brimos que a despesa pública escala sublinearmente com o tamanho da
população, indicando economias de escala para gastos públicos conforme
as cidades aumentam sua população. O comportamento de dimensiona-
mento persiste após a dessegregação por tipo de contrato. Além disso,
usando os indicadores ajustados à escala, que representam os desvios das
leis de escala, caracterizamos diferentes padrões de atividade de compras
entre os grupos regionais. Assim, obtemos uma nova caracterização local
dos municípios com base na semelhança da atividade de compras. Es-
tes resultados constituem uma estrutura para estudar quantitativamente
os gastos públicos locais, permitindo aos legisladores uma base mais
apropriada para análises comparativas.
Palavras-chave: Politicas Públicas, Contratação Pública, Análise Com-
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Public procurement is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) as the purchase by governments and
state-owned enterprises of goods and services [1]. Currently it stands
as an essential public sector instrument empowering policymakers to
effectively push-forward inclusive, [2] innovation driven, and economic
growth generating [3–5] policies. Among OECD countries, public pro-
curement weighs, on average, 29% of all governmental expenditures
[2] and 12% of global OECD country’s gross domestic product (GDP)
(14%[6] among European Union (EU) countries). Moreover, given the
relevance for economic activity of public procurement mechanisms, the
European Commission has established a common framework for pub-
lic procurement aimed at ensuring equal treatment and transparency,
reduce fraud and corruption and remove legal administrative barriers
to participation in cross-border tenders [7]. While at the same time,
open data on procurement contracts is increasing in volume and quality.
Therefore opening space and opportunities for analytical frameworks
that effectively evaluate the effectiveness and impact of public sector
activities at different scales and dimensions comparatively. However,
few studies have explored adequate methodologies that account for non-
linearities in spending dynamics or examined the inference potential in
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
public procurement data [8, 9].
Here, in the present work, Urban Scaling Laws (USL), which are
rooted in statistical physics and complexity sciences, are used to charac-
terise the public procurement activity of Portuguese municipalities. USL
[10–13] have been widely used across different disciplines to describe
the relationship between socio-economic indicators in relation to the
population size of population agglomerates. USL literature has invited
a rethinking of existing urban planning frameworks and comparative
indicators [14] while prompting researchers to look for the existence of
underlying universal laws in cities and urban growth. Nevertheless, to
the best of the authors knowledge, these procedures were never used to
the study of public procurement in the published literature.
The next chapter introduces a brief context on public procurement
and its most recent developments that made the present analysis possible.
Together with an look over related work published both on procurement
data analysis and municipal comparative studies. Chapter 3 continues
with details on the methodology used namely Urban Scaling Laws, the
data sources and all the processing steps taken. Chapter 4 shows the
analysis of results demonstrating a characterization of municipality pro-
curement activity compared with other Socio-Economic indicators. It is
proposed the use of revealed deviation from the Urban Scaling Laws by
each municipality, latter called Scale-Adjusted Indicators, as a mean to
develop a data-driven comparative analysis and analyze municipalities
from different standpoints. Chapter 5 concludes the work with some final
remarks and a discussion of the results obtained together with some of
the most critical limitations of the present work and the future directions











To understand the already published work in the field or the lack of it, the
current section starts with an introduction to modern Public Procurement
especially focused on the European Union laws and guidelines. Followed
by an analysis on approaches and ways procurement data has been anal-
ysed, to which fields and to what conclusions it has been applied. Adding
a research on published work focused on comparative analysis mostly
applied at the municipal level. This chapter aims to highlight the most
relevant work published on this subject and raise the readers attention to
the importance and novelty of the research that follows.
Public Procurement
Public procurement stands as the process of acquiring goods or services
from an external source by a public authority. The subject of procure-
ment are goods or services which state authorities often cannot produce
themselves. A common example would be a construction work in which
a municipality does not have the in-house resources to do it as they are
often big projects and not frequent. It stands as a fundamental tool for
3
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governments to fulfill their duties and obligations to the general public.
Fair public procurement is rooted in the European Union since its
conception. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union[15]
defines as core functional principles, among others, the free movement
of goods and services, the core subject of modern procurement. From
there, policies and court rulings have favoured values like equality of
treatment, transparency, mutual recognition and proportionality[16].
Public procurement has come a long way, from rigid pen and pa-
per contracts mostly done at the national level to digital cross continent
announcements. Relevant developments in procurement harmonization
within the EU occur in 2004. The publication of directives 2004/18/CE
and 2004/17/CE in which the EU advises member states to adhere to elec-
tronic procurement, and is often referred as the most influential directive
that set in motion the adoption of e-Procurement and as a consequence
open online procurement data by the member states. Delegating to each
country its implementation but forcing all contracts above 6,242,000€ for
public works contracts and 249,000€ for public supplies and service con-
tracts[17] to be published in the Official European Journal (Supplement
S of the Journal) and be digitally accessible at https://ted.europa.eu.
In recent years these thresholds were reduced to increase the number of
procurement reported to the EU and as a consequence, the each state’s
procurement transparency. The Portuguese Procurement Portal, has been
made available in 2008, and aims to report, not only the contracts above
the EU thresholds, but to report all procurement happening in the state.
This led to a high quality portal that allows citizens to thoroughly inspect
governmental contracts. Eventually leading to be selected as a case study
in one of the latest, most detailed, reports by the Commission on the
compliance and quality of public procurement systems[18]. The present
work focuses on this data and will further describe it in the next chapter.
To provide a broader picture on procurement we quickly look at the
world’s biggest economy, the United States. Holding a long and solid
history on public procurement. At first, very important in the defense
areas and later on as a mechanism to stimulate the economy and certain
4
sectors such as the information technology procurement[19]. In 2014, the
US passed the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA) Act
of 2014, which calls for better transparency regarding federal expenditures.
Federal procurement data is readily available at www.usaspending.gov.
Meanwhile, at the local level, an uniform data source is still nonexistent
[20].
Open procurement data, is still relatively new and datasets are gen-
erally small and not representative of all the public procurement market.
In 2001, Thai [21] claimed most analysis being done were reports by
agencies in charge of these platforms and not so much by the academic
community or the general public. From the research conducted for this
work there seems to be improvements but the general trend seems to
continue. This also derives from the fact that open data is still scarce and
with the increase and improvement of quality of the data more academic
interest will be paid to e-Procurement data.
Public procurement data analysis
Most analyses on public procurement often revolve around laws or specific
procurement areas. On this chapter those will not be looked over as the
focus here is on the data generated by these contracts and the procurement
market as a whole. As previously mentioned, e-Procurement data can be
used to characterize the expenses profile of Public Spending. While most
analysis are conducted by organizations responsible for these contracts,
there is also a topic of interest for researchers like Garcia et al [22] that
explores the data for Spain to extract insights on how the government is
spending public money and derive possible next analysis to the already
existing data.
Fazekas et al. [23] use data on Public procurement in Hungary to
signal potential red flags in public procurement behavior and from this
infer a corruption indicator that can be used as a potential signal to policy
5
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makers for errors or bad will in Public Procurement agents. With a data-
set of 2 million e-Procurement contracts Gallego et al.[24] accesses the
risk of malfeasance and possible inefficiencies in the process of procuring.
In 2015, researchers looking at California bid contracts estimate the risk
of collusion for high value procurement contracts [25]. And still on
corruption, researchers have a looked at the risk of bunching within the
EU and its effect in diminishing cost-effectiveness of public procurement
[26].
Another common subject of analysis is the environmental/sustainabil-
ity impact of procurement measures. One interesting study in this area is
the one conducted in the Netherlands that using text mining techniques
signal a potentially warming downwards trend in contracts referring
sustainable public procurement[27].
In the last years the number and the different types of ideas to explore
this data seem to be expanding. On a recent study, researchers from
different organizations look at German procurement data and attempt
to track the impact on innovation of e-Procurement, concluding that
setting innovation as a criteria in opposition to have only lower price
leads to innovation in the business sector even though is more effective
for stimulating the diffusion of new technologies rather than promoting
radically new inventions [28]. One of the important new points to have
in consideration when using public procurement [7].
In 2019 researchers looking at Russian bid contracts assess the risk of
bid rigging [29]. And in 2020 research have seemed to take e-Procurement
in Switzerland ICT to ensure it follows sustainable procurement goals
[30].
To finalize, the work presented by Ladislav et al. [8] represents most
similar work that dives in to the public contract data, in this case Czech
contracts. The authors apply methods from statistical physics to derive
possible hypothesis on the functioning of the public procurement markets
with a high focus on collaboration and assessing corruption risks.
6
Comparative studies
The perfect allocation of resources to achieve results is impossible. Which
does not imply that improvements to the current status quo are not possible.
One such a way of improving this is by comparison. Looking at different
actors and given a set of inputs and outputs compare them and identify
goodpractices. This definition can be broadly applied inmultiple contexts.
The present section looks at recent comparative studies with a focus on
local authorities comparison as this is the subject of the present work.
Comparative analysis of public practices is not new. In 2002 a join
research from different universities access performance-based manage-
ment systems with data of annual reports from nine municipalities from
each country [31].
Portuguese decreasing population comparison recurring to municipal
director plans [32] to evaluate how different municipalities are dealing
with the decreasing population.
On a 8-year research Chinese researchers compare 8 cities in regards
to efficiency of their water management system and it becomes obvious
that the processes done by the cities of Shanghai and Beijing and leading
to better result that the ones employed by the other 6 municipalities.[33]
To close this chapter, an important last mention is to the work done by
Raan et. al [34] in which, using the same methodology as the one used in
this paper (describe on the next chapter), the authors access the validity
of urban agglomerations and compared them to municipality divisions.
One important conclusion in the work is the importance of municipalities
when compared for instance with urban agglomerations with the same
size. From this we can see that there are multiple possible aggregations
that we can use when looking at procurement contracts on section 3 the
level choice is detailed the motives behind it are explained













In general, Urban Scaling Laws or USL models the relationship be-
tween an indicator, . , and the population size, - , of a set of population
agglomerates (e.g., cities or urban areas) as a power-law, such as
. ∼ U- V (3.1)
where V is the scaling factor and U represents the natural baseline activity
of a region [35, 36]. While several indicators – water consumption,
housing, or jobs [37] – follow a linear relationship (V = 1), the more
interesting cases are those in which . exhibits a super-linear (V > 1) or
sub-linear (V < 1) relationship with - . Such cases identify particular
indicators that either scale above (super-linear) orbelow (sub-linear) linear
growth with increasing population size. Super-linear behavior is often
observed in the region economic output [38–44], energy consumption
and pollution [45–47], employment [48, 49] criminality [49–53], number
of patents [44, 48, 52, 54], wages [52], employment in R&D [52] and
urbanized area [48]. Sub-linear relationships often include the total length
9
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of road network [40, 52], energy supply networks [55]. In other cases, like
supply networks, exhibit sub or super linear behavior depending on the
industry [55], and voter turnout [56]. In sum, population agglomerates
present clear trade-offs between human activity outputs that increase from
agglomeration, and infrastructure costs that diminish with agglomeration.
Previous works on USL have particularly, but not always, focused
in cities [57]. However, cities do not necessarily define administrative
governance boundaries, and it remains an open question to which extend
cities’ boundaries accurately represent an appropriate population aggre-
gation unit [11, 58, 59]. For instance, Arcaute et al [37] uses information
on commuting times to define new boundaries, raising questions about
the accuracy of some scaling factors. Here, we focus on municipali-
ties as they provide an appropriate balance between a regional unit of
governance and a natural population agglomerate.
Regional organization
Before presenting the data, an explanation on the way we have grouped
the data in the way we have. This section presents an overview on
Portugal’s geographical organization and shows alternative divisions that
could have been chosen. Portugal is a country with long-settled external
borders and relatively slow-changing internal divisions. The first and
obvious distinction is between mainland Portugal and the autonomous
regions, the islands of Madeira and Açores. From there, several regional
boundaries were developed that could have been used in the present
analysis. Districts are a possible division that splits the continental
into 18 regions established as they coordinate local services such as the
police and national guard, social security center, or road administration.
Although historically significant, they are now being faded out in favor
of the European Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)
developed by Eurostat and employed in Portugal for statistical purposes.
TheNUTS division in Portugal represented in figure 3.1(a)-(b) showmore
10
(a) NUTS2 division (b) NUTS3 division (c) Municipal division
Figure 3.1: Regional divisions in Portugal 1
modern and recommend statistical division. NUTS III also represents
Intermunicipal communities, which have a council and an assembly
mainly constituted by elected members of the municipal assemblies.
Although these two divisions are statistically recommended and al-
ready have administrative power, they still lack two aspects deemed
necessary for the present analysis, a significant amount of direct public
contracts and direct elect government. Leaving two smaller regional
divides: municipalities and parishes. Municipalities 3.1(c) represent the
second-largest administrative division whose governance body is elected
by universal suffrage. They are also the administrative division with the
most stable regional boundaries and upon which city governance respon-
sibility falls, thus, a suitable candidate to study the scaling behavior of
procurement activity.
To support this, the previouslymentioned study in theNetherlands also
looks at different urban agglomerations in which among other conclusions
they hint that the municipality organization performs better as compared
to alternative organizations with the same population size[34].
1Images sourced from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NUTS_statistical_
regions_of_Portugal
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Data
Public procurement in Portugal is managed by Instituto dos Mercados
Públicos, do Imobiliário e da Construção (IMPIC) and all data is shared
on the online portal https://base.gov.pt.
The present dataset is a combined list of all contract data shared by
the same institution on https://dados.gov.pt, the Portuguese open
data portal. This data was shared following the Open Contracting Data
Standard 2 an unified procurement format. Making it easier for researchers
to explore theories in different countries datasets.
We focus our analysis on a data set comprising 930.513 contracts is-
sued between January 2009 and December 2018. Each contract identifies
the issuer that buys services/goods/works from the supplier. For each
contract, we have collected the following features: issue date, the value of
the contract (in euros), type of contract, and Fiscal Numbers of both the is-
suer and supplier. We analyze contracts issued by the 278 Municipalities
that constitute Continental Portugal. We have not considered municipali-
ties in Azores and Madeira archipelagos as they represent autonomous
administrative regions. Since municipalities can constitute municipal
companies, we have aggregated all municipalities and respective child
companies into a single entity. The aggregation was hand-curated with
support from the Yearly Financial Booklet of Portuguese Municipalities
[60–62]. The pre-processing steps include:
1. Removing contracts with a value equal or smaller than one;
2. Identify the Fiscal Number of eachMunicipality to use as a primary
key;
3. Aggregate municipal companies to the parent Municipality;
4. Discard all non Municipality related procurement contracts;
5. The value of contracts that involve more than one municipality was































































Figure 3.2: a) Number of monthly procurement issued between 2009 and
2019 by Portuguese municipalities. b) Total value in euros derived from
procurement. In both a) and b), each bar corresponds to a month/year and
vertical red lines indicate Municipal elections held nationwide. c) Spatial
distribution of the total number of issued procurement by municipality.
d) Spatial distribution of the total value spent in procurement.3
The final dataset comprises 310.819 contracts totaling a value of 16.9
Billion Euros. Panel a) of Figure 3.2 shows the monthly number of
contracts issued, while panel b) shows the total value. Vertical lines
indicate the dates of nation-widemunicipal elections took place. Through
visual inspection, it is possible to identify a tendency for municipalities
to increase the number of procurement contracts issued in the months
leading to elections. However, the same does not necessarily translate
into an increase in expenditure. Figure 3.2c) and d) show the spatial
distribution of the total number of contracts and the total value per
municipality.
Common Procurement Vocabulary
In the present work we analyze the procurement activity per municipality
in total but also along the three contract types theymight represent. These
3Azores and Madeira archipelagos are omitted and have not been used in the analysis. At
the time the research was conducted data for 2019 was incomplete, contracts of that year were
not included in the analysis and in the discussion of results.
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Figure 3.3: Volume of contracts per CPV, from a visual analysis it is
possible to see the 3 types of contracts are representative even though
service contracts are in higher number. The values are normalized with
a division by the mean. (See in Table 1 in the Appendix for definitions)























































Figure 3.4: Procurement expenses per CPV, here we see works represents
the highest part in municipalities expenses. The values are normalized
with a division by the mean. (See in Table 1 in the Appendix for
definitions)
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Table 3.1: Description of the type of Public Procurement Contracts
according to the UE public procurement guidelines.
Contract type Description
Work Contracts Public contracts having as their objective either the execution,
or both the design and execution, of works, for example building
or civil engineering works such as a road or sewage plant.
Goods Contracts Public contracts having as their object the purchase,
lease, rental or hire purchase with or without option to buy,
products such as stationery, vehicles or computers.
Service Contracts Public contracts other than public works or
supply contracts having as their object the provision of services
such as consultancy, training or cleaning services.
can be Work, Goods, or Service contracts. Table S2 summarizes the
definition of each one of these types of contracts.
Moreover, each procurement contract is also classified according to
the nature of the procurement transaction. It follows the Common Pro-
curement Vocabulary (CPV) classification. The CPV was developed
by the European Union and corresponds to an 8-digit and 4 level deep
hierarchical classification. Table S3 lists the 2-digit (first level) of the
classification as an example of the comprehensiveness of the classifica-
tion the full table can be found in 5. In the main manuscript we decided
to not perform the analysis at the CPV level because it is a very wide clas-
sification that also presents a very skewed distribution of procurements.
That is, a small group CPVs represent the majority of the procurement
contracts while in most CVPs we only have a few observations.
Figure S1 shows the distribution of the number and total value of Pro-
curement Contracts by type along the first level of the CPV classification
Nonetheless, we have also conducted an exploratory analysis of
the scaling behavior of the procurement data at the first level of the
CPV classification. However, since in many cases municipalities might
not have executed contracts in a particular CPV class, we have only
included coefficients for estimations with at least 100 observations (100
municipalities). Coefficients are summarized in Table S4.
Each procurement is associated with a type of contract it represents,
15
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which follows the standard classification from the European Commission
[7] show in table 3.1 Hence, we have computed the total expenditure in
procurement contracts per year for each municipality, as well as the total
expenditure by procurement contract type. Moreover, since the yearly
expenditure is rather noisy, we have applied a sliding window technique
(moving average) of three years. In that sense, the procurement values
at year H correspond to an average of the values from years H − 2, H − 1,
and H. The reported noise can have multiple sources. For instance, a
municipality might issue a procurement for the execution of construction
in one year that reflects in the forthcoming yearly budgets and thus
decreases its construction activity in the following years.
The dataset is a tabular dataset with contracts as row and their prop-
erties as columns, from the contract properties we have extracted 5
important properties:
• buyer.id - Fiscal identifier of the procuring entity
• tender.contractPeriod.startDate - Start date of the
contract
• tender.value.amount - The value of the contract
• tender.mainProcurementCategory - The main category,
explained in Table 3.1
• tender.items - Column containing one or multiple common
procurements codes(CPV) for the given contract. More information
on the CPV can be found on Fig 3.(3–4)
Finally, we enriched the data set with additional indicators by mu-
nicipality and year. From Pordata [63] we have sourced data on Social
Integration Income; House Prices; Number of Public Workers; Total
Births; Number of Large Corporations; Number of Divorces; Amount
of Credit; Number of Medical Doctors; Number of Culture Attendees;
Imports and Exports Volumes; and Environment Expenses. While on
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Table 3.2: Socio Economic variables description
Dataset Years Missing values Public Unit Mean Std Min Max
Imports 2009-2018 0 Y Euro 2.03E+08 1.09E+09 0 1.83E+10
Exports 2009-2018 0 Y Euro 1.59E+08 4.66E+08 0 7.44E+09
Social Integration Income 2009-2018 0 Y Euro 1221 2755 0 31315
Energy Consumption 2009-2017 0 Y kWh 22101 34272 1226 383252
Total births 2009-2018 0 Y Nº 360 700 0 18276
Doctors 2009-2018 0 Y Nº 158 650 0 9573
Large Corporations 2009-2017 0 Y Nº 4 18 0 285
Culture Atendees 2009-2018 0 Y Nº 33086 183685 0 3006910
Divorces 2009-2018 0 Y Nº 67 135 0 2143
Amount of Credit 2009-2017 0 Y Euro 7.44E+08 8E+06 0 8E+06
House Prices 2009-2018 0 Y Euro 52647 48297 1208 575900
Public workers 2009-2017 0 Y Nº 428 657 49 10106
Environment Expenses 2009-2018 0 Y Euro 2038 5448 0 86858
Total crime 2009-2017 0 Y Nº 1259 2963 15 4250
Self-Reported Gross Income 2011-2017 0 N Euro 289071 672063 8574 9416926
ATM withdrawals 2011-2017 0 N Euro 8.8E+07 2E+08 3E+06 3E+09
Credit given for housing 2011-2017 0 N Thousands of euro 327468 1E+06 7356 2E+07
Municipal Property Tax 2011-2017 0 N Thousands of euro 4800 10072 40 118153
Average Income of a full time worker 2011-2017 0 N Euro 895 163 673 2331
Municipality employees 2011-2017 0 N Nº 7167 19149 178 295474
Volume of Business (Accomodation) 2011-2017 90 N Euro 2.6E+07 8.3E+07 4E+05 2E+09
Volume of Business (Catering) 2011-2017 0 N Euro 1.6E+08 3.4E+08 2E+06 5E+09
Volume of Business (Retail) 2011-2017 361 N Euro 1.6E+08 3.4E+08 2E+06 5E+09
INE4 [64] – ATMWithdrawals, Municipal Property Tax, Volume of Busi-
ness in Accommodation, Catering, and Retail; Individual Gross Income;
Average Salary of Full-Time Workers;











The present analysis starts by comparing the estimated scaling coefficients
from municipal procurement activity with those estimated from a wide
set of socio-economic indicators. The coefficients have been estimated
independently for each year between 2011 and 2018. Figure 4.1a shows
the average coefficient (Y-Axis) per indicator (X-Axis) with error bars
representing the standard deviation.
In general the obtained scaling coefficients are inline with previous
findings in the USL literature, thus supporting the choice of analysis at
the municipality level. Namely, a super-linear behavior is observed for the
volumeof imports (V = 2.05±0.12) andexports (V = 1.79±0.10), number
ofmedical doctors (V = 1.38±0.01), volumeofbusiness from retail except
car sales (V = 1.21±0.01), amount of credit (V = 1.21±0.04), municipal
property tax (V = 1.19 ± 0.05), number of divorces (V = 1.18 ± 0.02),
total volume of house mortgages (V = 1.17 ± 0.02), volume of business
from catering (V = 1.16 ± 0.03), number of workers (V = 1.16 ± 0.01),
number of births (V = 1.15± 0.02), ATM withdrawals (V = 1.14± 0.01),
self-reported gross income (V = 1.10 ± 0.01), and reported crime (V =
1.08 ± 0.04). Linear scaling is observed for total volume of business
from accommodation (V = 0.99 ± 0.05). Sub-linear scaling is observed
19
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Scaling Coefficient: 0.90 | R2: 0.77





















































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: a) Average scaling coefficients for multiple socio-economic
metrics (Black) and all procurement expenses (red). Moreover, we also
show the coefficients obtained for the different types of procurement
contracts: works (blue), goods (yellow), and services (purple). Error bars
indicate the standard deviations of estimated coefficients for the different
years. Panel b) shows the yearly changes in the scaling coefficients for
procurement activity. Panel c) exemplifies the identified relationships
between the procurement expenditure (euros) and population size for the
year of 2018. In panels b) and c) we highlight the results formunicipalities
with more than 104 residents.
for energy consumption (V = 0.88 ± 0.006), social integration income
(V = 0.97 ± 0.03), environment expenses (V = 0.84 ± 0.06), number
of large corporations (V = 0.81 ± 0.04), number of culture attendees
(V = 0.70 ± 0.13), number of public workers (V = 0.70 ± 0.06), and
house prices (V = 0.47 ± 0.02).
Figure 4.1b–c explores more in detail the results obtained from the
total procurement expenses per municipality. Figure 4.1b shows the
yearly change in the scaling coefficient, which exhibits an upward tem-
poral trend. Light colored points indicate scaling coefficients estimated
20
when considering all municipalities, while dark-colored considers only
municipalities with a population size larger than 104. Figure 4.1c shows
a representative example of the scaling behavior from the year 2018.
Further, it shows the impact of including (lighter) or not (darker) munici-
palities with a population lower than 104 in the estimation. In all cases,
the coefficient shows a sub-linear relationship between the total public


























































































































































Scaling Coefficient: 0.84 | R2: 0.62
Scaling Coefficient: 0.75 | R2: 0.64
Scaling Coefficient: 0.95 | R2: 0.62
Scaling Coefficient: 0.80 | R2: 0.64
Scaling Coefficient: 0.99 | R2: 0.68
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g) h) i)
Figure 4.2: Panels a–c) Scaling relationships between total procurement
expenses, by type, in 2018 and population size. Panels d–e) Scaling
coefficient per year and type of expenses. Panels g–i) show the estimated
scaling coefficient for each contract type when only the nthmost populated
municipalities are used to estimate the scaling coefficient. In other words,
is as ifwe are removing the least populatedmunicipalities from the right to
the left. Error bars indicate the standard deviation of the estimated scaling
coefficient. In panels a–e) lighter colors indicate the analysis conducted
on all Municipalities, darker colors on the subset of municipalities with
a population greater or equal to 104. Each column indicates results for
a different type of contract: Services (left); Goods (middle); and Works
(right). In Panels d–f) lines indicate the best linear model but should only
serve as a guideline.
21
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS DISCUSSION
Figure 4.2 extends the analysis done in Figure 4.1b and Figure 4.1c to
different procurement contract types: Services, Goods, and Works. Like
in Figure 4.1. Light colors refer to the entire set of municipalities, while
darker colors represent the sample of municipalities with a population
size larger than 104. Figure 4.2a–c shows the scaling relationships in the
year of 2018 for all three types of procurement contracts. As with the
results in Figure 4.1c, Goods and Works contracts show an evident sub-
linear scaling. In contrast, Services show an almost linear relationship if
only the most populated municipalities are considered but a sub-linear
relationship when the entire set is under consideration.
Moreover, in Figure 4.2d–f, we show that, unlike the results in
Figure 4.1b, the yearly upward trend of the scaling coefficient is absent
in Goods and Works contracts. However, for Works contracts, exhibit a
transition, around 2014/16, between two regimes. Such behavior is not
necessarily surprising. The transition matches the time when Portugal
left the bailout program and can be an indication of the impact that the
program had on public contracts. However, a causal relationship between
the reported phenomena and its context requires amore extensive analysis,
which is not within the scope of this work.
Figure 4.2g–i explores the impact of removing (from right to left)
sequentially the least populated municipalities in the estimation of the
scaling coefficient (Y-axis). We expect two limiting scenarios: First, when
we only consider the most populated municipalities, large variations on
the estimated scaling coefficients as the addition/removal of observations
will impact significantly in the regression; Secondly, given the over-
representation of small municipalities and the fact that we are using a
logarithmic scale, removing smaller municipalities should lead to small
corrections in the scaling estimation. We identify the domain of these
two scenarios with a shaded background in Figure 4.2g–i. However,
in between these two limiting scenarios, we observe an interval where
the scaling coefficient is stable and resilient to the addition/removal
of observations. In that regime, we qualitatively observe the same
relationship between the estimated coefficients of the three types of
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contracts: Services with higher coefficients close to one and Works has
the lowest coefficients around 0.75.
In the remaining of the manuscript, we will focus our analysis on the
entire set of municipalities. Such choice provides a more comprehensive
picture of the regional dynamics at play among Portuguese municipalities.
Scale-Adjusted Indicators
One major challenge when developing a comparative analysis of regional
data relates to how an indicator scales along the dimension of analysis
(e.g., region area, population size, etc.). For instance, it is common to
compare regions on a per capita basis. However, such scaling/assumption
is only accurate if the indicator under study scales linearly with population
size. Since that is not the case for most indicators, see Figure 4.1, we
can end up with erroneous conclusions. In that sense, Urban Scaling
literature proposes using, instead, the residuals of each region from the
specific scaling law as a reference model. In our case, the residuals
indicate which municipalities spend more/less in procurement contracts
according to what is expected from their population size.
In that sense, we follow by estimating the so-called Scale-Adjusted
Indicators (SAI) [10, 53, 65] as a means to quantify deviations of each
municipality procurement activity from what would be expected from






where .8,C is the observed expenditure of municipality 8 on year C, and
. (#8,C) is the predicted value given the population size of such munici-
pality. Visualized on the dashed red lines in figure 4.3. Unlike per capita
indicators, the SAI are dimensionless and independent of population
size [10, 53, 65]. The SAI capture human and social dynamics specific
to a given place and time. It is a true local measure that allows direct
comparison between two regions and provides meaningful comparative
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Figure 4.3: Scalling law for total public procurement over all the years
and categories. Scale-Adjusted Indicators highlighted in red dashed lines.
information between population agglomerates and regional governance
bodies. One interesting application of the SAI has been in the develop-
ment of rankings that allow quantifying an indicator of interest [10]. In the
Supporting Information, we provide a discussion of such an application
to the procurement activity in Portugal.
Figure 4.4 above shows the distribution of SAI obtained for different
types of contracts for 2018 and the best fit Normal Distribution for the
SAI estimated per year. In all but one case, SAI are Normally Distributed.
Moreover, the SAI are uncorrelated with population size and show no
heteroscedasticity.
Ranking Municipalities
One common, and well known, application of the SAI concerns the rank-
ing of regions according to their activity. Since the SAI is dimensionless
and already correct for population differences, they provide an interesting
reference to identify which municipalities have spent more or less that
their intrinsic capacities predict. Figure 4.6 shows the ranking for all 278
24














































































Figure 4.4: Distributions of Scale-Adjusted Indicators (SAI). Bars show
the distribution of SAIs for 2018; curves show the best fitted Normal
Distribution to the SAI data for each year. Except for the observations
for one year and one type of contract (Goods in 2014) the hypothesis that
SAI follow a normal distribution cannot be disproved using Cramér–von
Mises criterion at the p-value = 0.05 threshold. .
municipalities on the three procurement contracts types in the year of
2018. A set of relevant municipalities are highlighted plus the top three
municipalities.
We can see several cases of municipalities with positive SAI in
one procurement type that have negative on another. This naturally
raises questions on the richness of procurement profiles that exist and
the potential to characterize municipalities by their profile of public
procurement.
One important take from the rankings it to see that big municipalities
like Porto and Lisboa seem to yield positive scaling in all three types of
contracts, possibly denoting a tendency for central administrative areas to
have disproportionately large spending budgets. This analysis was only
done for the year of 2018 and to strengthen these claims a deeper yearly
25



















































Figure 4.5: Ranking of Procurement Activity Portuguese Municipalities
on the three different types of contracts under analysis (Services, Goods,
and Works) using the Scale-Adjusted Indicators.
analysis would be required.
Procurement Activity and Regional Economic Activity
We start by inspecting how procurement activity relates to regional eco-
nomic activity, which we capture through a wide range of indicators
commonly used to estimate purchasing power [64]. To that end, we
estimate the Pearson correlation between the SAI associated with pro-
curement activity by contract type – Services, Goods, and Works – and
the SAI obtained from regional economic indicators such as: the average
salary of full-time works; self-reported individual gross income; total vol-
ume of ATM withdrawals; total value collected from Municipal property
tax; the number of workers; total amount of loans; Volume of Business
26


































































Volume of Business (Catering) Volume of Business (Retail, excludingcars sales)
Municipal Property Tax Number of Workers Total Loans
Average Salary of Full Time Workers Individual Gross Income (Self Reported) ATM Withdrawals
Works Goods Services
Figure 4.6: Correlations between the Scale-Adjusted Indicators of Public
Procurement Activity and Regional Indicators of Economic Activity.
activities in Accommodation, Catering, and Retail (excluding car sales).
Figure 4.6 shows the yearly correlations between the procurement
SAI and regional indicators. In all panels, the Y-axis indicates the Pearson
correlation, and X-axis represents the year of analysis. Each curve’s color
indicates the type of procurement contract, and each panel depicts the
results for a particular regional economic activity indicator. Surprisingly,
Works procurement contracts exhibit null to negative correlation in most
indicators. Exceptions are in the number of workers and the total volume
of loans. This interesting finding raises questions on the impact of public
procurement work contracts as an effective policy instrument that we
believe deserves future work. These results show that different types of
public procurement might spill over to different economic dimensions in
different ways. In contrast, Services and Goods procurement contracts
show a stable positive correlation with most indicators.
More importantly, these results show that there exists a link between
procurement activity and the regional economy. In that sense, such
27
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economic indicators can be used effectively as monitoring proxies for
the evaluation of public policy programs. Moreover, the short analysis
also supports the potential of using procurement SAI as an explanatory
variable in models that look to understand the importance and relevance
of different types of public procurement activity in the local economy.
Regional Divide















































































































Figure 4.7: Yearly Differences in the Scaling-Adjusted Indicators be-
tween different groups of Portuguese Municipalities. Panel a) shows the
differences between North and South, and Panel b) shows the differences
between Coastal and Interior. Panel c) shows the Portuguese municipali-
ties colored according to the groups they have been assigned to. District
capitals are indicated. Panels d–f show the Scale-Adjusted Indicators
of each municipality for each procurement contract type in the year of
2018. Minimum and maximum of the color range is set to the maximum
absolute Scale-Adjusted Indicator observed.
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One application of Scale-Adjusted Indicators is to identify and com-
pare patterns between groups of regions. By helping to identify com-
monalities but also exceptions, it can aid policymakers in pushing the
adequate policies for regional development [66]. In that sense, Portugal is
marked by different regional development profiles related to the natural,
social, and economic diversity that loosely runs from North to South and
its urban system anchored on two main metropolitan areas (Lisboa and
Porto). On the other hand, the country deals with substantial challenges
stemming from significant migration movements towards coastal regions
(and the ongoing decline in population growth) that, in time, amplified
territorial disparities mainly marked by the dichotomy of Interior/Coastal
regions [67–71].
In light of such regional realities in Portugal, it is interesting to
investigate whether public procurement activities reveal some of these
well-known dichotomies, whichmeans if differences among the described
groups exhibit different and distinguishable patterns. To that end, and as
a first exercise, we grouped municipalities according to whether they are
located in the Coast/Interior or the North/South of Portugal1. We defined
as Coastalmunicipalities all those that have a coastline or that are enclaves
of municipalities with a coastline, else they are categorized as Interior.
Moreover, we used the coordinates of each municipality capital as a point
of reference to classify them as being in the North or South. In particular,
we classified as North the 140 municipalities whose city coordinates are
the northernmost; the remaining 138 are classified as being in the South.
Figure 4.7c shows the classification of each municipality.
Figure 4.7a–b compares the differences (Δ) in the procurement SAI
activity between different groups of municipalities. In particular, Fig-
ure 4.7a compares North and South municipalities (Δ = SAINORTH −
SAISOUTH) and Figure 4.7a compares Coastal and Interior municipalities
(Δ = SAICOASTAL − SAIINTERIOR).
1It is noteworthy to mention that there is no generally agreed definition of these regional
groups, in that sense in this work we take the most neutral definition possible. However, using
this methodology, further regional definitions can be tested in future work.
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In Figure 4.7a a positive/negative difference means that Northern/-
Southern municipalities exhibit in average larger/smaller SAI than their
counterpart. From Figure 4.7a we observe that there is a clear dichotomy
that characterized by the common perceptions and differences between
Northern and Southern regions, in that, Northern municipalities tend to
exhibit larger average SAI in Works while Southern are characterized by
larger SAI in Services and Goods. These patterns remain qualitatively the
same, although Services procurement contracts seem to been converging
to parity between the two groups.
In Figure 4.7b a positive/negative difference means that Coastal/In-
terior municipalities exhibit in average larger/smaller SAI than their
counterpart. Once again, results show that there are clear differences
between both these regions, in particular Coastal municipalities tend to
have higher SAI in Goods and Services procurement contracts, while
Works contracts have evolved from being larger in the Interior to reach
parity since 2016.






















































































































































Figure 4.8: Clustering of Municipalities according to the Scale-Adjusted
Indicators patterns. Panel a) associates municipalities to a cluster. Panels
b–e) show the average SAI in the different procurement contract types
– Works (blue), Services (purple), and Goods (yellow) – allowing to
characterize the procurement activity patterns of each cluster.
Figure 4.7d–f shows the spatial distribution of the 2018 SAI across the
Portuguese municipalities for each type of procurement contracts. We set
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the color range to be the same in all three cases. Interestingly, the distri-
bution of SAI does not map directly into the regional groups that we have
analyzed above; that is, we cannot clearly distinguish between North/-
South and Coastal/Interior. Instead, they show a more heterogeneous
spatial distribution.
Grouping municipalities can provide interesting insights into existing
differences among regions. In that sense, the SAI can be the basis
to identify clusters of municipalities with similar procurement activity
patterns. To that end, we clustered municipalities using the K-Means
algorithm to identify the four clusters of municipalities with similar
activity patterns. We performed the cluster by considering that each
observation consisted of the estimated SAI of each type of procurement
per municipality per year. See the Supplementary Information for more
information about the clustering procedure.
We have identified four main groups of municipalities that we refer
to as clusters I, II, III, and IV. Figure 4.8a shows the spatial distribution
of clusters estimated from procurement activity. It does not stem from
pre-conceived perceptions of historical, geographical, or demographic
nature and translates the information revealed by the municipalities’
procurement activity. Naturally, it presents clusters with higher spatial
variance, contrary to the analysis conducted above. Figure 4.8b–e shows
the yearly average SAI for each procurement type in each cluster. Cluster
I is characterized by average positive SAI in Works and average low
negative SAI in Services andGoods. Cluster II is characterizedby strongly
negative SAI inWorks and nearly null SAI in Services andGoods. Cluster
III is characterized by municipalities with strongly negative SAI in all
three types of contracts. Finally, cluster IV is defined by municipalities
with moderately positive SAI in all procurement contract types. Clusters
I and IV show, respectively, a predominance of Northern and Southern
municipalities. Clusters II and III are more geographically disperse.
The SAI can thus help identify different regions with different activity












It is often challenging to develop accurate indicators when most of the
times they do not scale linearly with, for example, population size. We
proposed using methods from Urban Scaling Laws to analyze procure-
ment activities among 278 Portuguese municipalities and by contract
type.
We have characterized the scaling coefficient of procurement activity
andput it at a glancewithvarious other indicators. Municipal procurement
activity tends to scale sub-linearly with population size, meaning that
increasing the population size lowers the value spent per capita in public
contracts. Such behavior is true for both the total value spent in public
procurement and specific types of contracts.
Looking at the scaling coefficients’ yearly variation, we identified a
trend that suggests an increase in the coefficient that is mostly associated
with a regime transition in the Works procurement contracts, whose
coefficient jumped from ≈ 0.7 to ≈ 0.85 around 2014/16.
Moreover, looking at individual deviations from the scaling laws, we
have explored its usefulness in characterizing different regional groups’
profiles. In that sense, we have shown that the SAI captures interesting
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differences between regional groups – North/South and Coastal/Interior
– of municipalities. The SAI also provides an alternative to estimate
the adequate groups in terms of similarity of procurement activity. We
show that the resulting groups/clusters of municipalities present differ-
ent procurement activity patterns and a non-trivial organization in the
Portuguese geography.
These last results demonstrate the validity of this type of analysis
for policymakers and researchers alike interested in using comparative
analysis, when possible data-driven, to understand better the impact of
their policies in populations.
The results here presented in furtherdetail are summarized inmanuscript
submitted for the PLOS ONE under the same name Scaling Behavior of
Public Procurement Activity[72] and at the moment of submission of this
thesis, it was in the state of waiting for review.
Limitations and Future Work
The results demonstrated here do not show a way that policymakers
should act or a preferred way in public procurement spending. What
is instead shown is the novelty of the data-driven analysis on public
procurement and, more specifically, using Urban Scaling Laws.
During this analysis, some extreme values were found where mu-
nicipalities spend much more or less than the calculated coefficients’
expected value. Meanwhile, this could potentially be a signal of malfea-
sance or failure to report expenses. There is also the possibility that
not all municipal fiscal identifiers were contained on the dataset, and
it lead to missing data. Ongoing work aims to develop a more robust
model to understand the link between public procurement activity at the
regional level and economic development. Such work should develop a
more robust model that allows controlling for other relevant factors [73].
Moreover, future work should also extend this analysis to other countries
and regions, particularly European public procurement repositories. The
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latter would allow us to validate the identified similarities and differences
in behaviors across countries with different processes and cultures.
As open data is slowly becoming more ubiquitous and it gets more
common for public bodies to share information, research like this will be
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Value and total number of





CPV first level divisions
id description
03 Agricultural, farming, fishing, forestry and related products
09 Petroleum products, fuel, electricity and other sources of energy
14 Mining, basic metals and related products
15 Food, beverages, tobacco and related products
16 Agricultural machinery
18 Clothing, footwear, luggage articles and accessories
19 Leather and textile fabrics, plastic and rubber materials
22 Printed matter and related products
24 Chemical products
30 Office and computing machinery, equipment and supplies except furniture and software packages
31 Electrical machinery, apparatus, equipment and consumables; lighting
32 Radio, television, communication, telecommunication and related equipment
33 Medical equipments, pharmaceuticals and personal care products
34 Transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation
35 Security, fire-fighting, police and defence equipment
37 Musical instruments, sport goods, games, toys, handicraft, art materials and accessories
38 Laboratory, optical and precision equipments (excl. glasses)
39 Furniture (incl. office furniture), furnishings, domestic appliances (excl. lighting) and cleaning products
41 Collected and purified water
42 Industrial machinery
43 Machinery for mining, quarrying, construction equipment
44 Construction structures and materials; auxiliary products to construction (except electric apparatus)
45 Construction work
48 Software package and information systems
50 Repair and maintenance services
51 Installation services (except software)
55 Hotel, restaurant and retail trade services
60 Transport services (excl. Waste transport)
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agencies services
64 Postal and telecommunications services
65 Public utilities
66 Financial and insurance services
70 Real estate services
71 Architectural, construction, engineering and inspection services
72 IT services: consulting, software development, Internet and support
73 Research and development services and related consultancy services
75 Administration, defence and social security services
76 Services related to the oil and gas industry
77 Agricultural, forestry, horticultural, aquacultural and apicultural services
79 Business services: law, marketing, consulting, recruitment, printing and security
80 Education and training services
85 Health and social work services
90 Sewage, refuse, cleaning and environmental services
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting services
98 Other community, social and personal services
50
Scaling coefficients per CPV
51
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CPV 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
03 - - - - - - - 0.37 0.53 0.29
09 - 0.42 0.47 - 0.32 - - - - 0.50
14 - 0.06 - - - - - 0.45 - 0.31
15 - - - - - - 0.29 0.26 0.44 0.30
16 - - - - - - - - - -
18 - - - - - - - - 0.58 0.72
19 - - - - - - - - - -
22 0.49 0.42 0.35 0.34 0.45 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.40
24 - 0.43 0.50 0.51 - 0.45 - 0.40 0.53 0.25
30 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.63 0.76 0.62 0.49
31 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.39 0.28 0.45 0.38 0.57 0.47 0.61
32 - 0.44 0.40 - - 0.29 0.35 - 0.40 0.41
33 - - - - - - - - - -
34 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.57 0.50 0.48 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.69
35 - - - - - - - - - -
37 0.33 0.27 - - - - 0.17 0.44 0.42 0.37
38 - - - - - - - - - 0.59
39 0.63 0.57 0.45 0.34 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.60 0.56 0.67
41 - - - - - - - - - -
42 0.25 0.44 0.51 - 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.30 0.43 0.45
43 - - - - - - - - - -
44 0.60 0.68 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.61 0.66 0.71 0.62 0.71
45 0.68 0.84 0.62 0.74 0.66 0.68 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.85
48 0.50 0.43 0.55 0.59 0.64 0.30 0.56 0.68 0.55 0.53
50 0.75 0.72 0.85 0.76 0.62 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.90
51 - - - - - - - - - 0.41
55 0.42 - 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.79 0.65 0.89 0.87
60 0.39 0.50 0.66 0.52 0.59 0.55 0.68 0.63 0.58 0.69
63 - - - - - - - - - -
64 - - - - 0.39 0.59 0.55 0.49 0.41 0.47
65 - - - - - - - - - 0.27
66 - - 0.25 - 0.39 0.47 0.41 0.59 0.58 0.49
70 - - - - - - - - - -
71 0.71 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.50 0.61 0.69 0.66 0.68 0.61
72 0.61 0.83 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.64 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.67
73 - - - - - - - - - -
75 - - - - - - - - - 0.40
76 - - - - - - - - - -
77 - - 0.43 0.54 0.26 0.34 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.43
79 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.78 0.89 0.86 0.77 0.87
80 0.20 0.37 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.17 0.11
85 - - 0.32 - 0.37 0.50 0.51 0.58 0.47 0.39
90 0.59 0.75 0.78 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.73 0.82 0.88
92 0.53 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.37 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.66
98 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.39 - 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.39 0.36
52
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